The Medusa Complex: A Theory
of Stoned Posthumanism
Ted Hiebert
Medusa was once a beautiful maiden, vying in beauty with Athene
herself, until one night she slept with Poseidon in one of Athene's own temples.
Outraged, Athene inflicted upon Medusa the punishment for which she is known,
turning her into a winged monster with glaring eyes, serpents for hair, and
a gaze that turned those around her to stone.[1]
This theory grows out of Medusa’s shadow, in particular
because the gaze of Medusa perfectly represents the intricacies of the question
I want to address. For the gaze of Medusa can be seen as a convincing metaphor
for the liberal humanist gaze—at essence an objectifying gaze, a gaze
that constitutes its subjects according to rules, most often unchosen by them,
but which never-the-less become the communal basis of Western living. But
this metaphor functions no less well with regard to the postmodern gaze—a
gaze that does not immobilize through bodily petrification but through the
intellectual paralysis of uncertain subjectivity. And finally, for the question
of the posthuman and its emphasis on all things self-reflexive, we need only
ask: what would happen when Medusa looks into the mirror and confronts
herself in the deadly gaze of her own vision? Here we find that Medusa’s fate is also the fate of
the posthuman, negotiating the psyche of one whose very gaze has become intoxicated
by potentialities, a proliferating imagination given the power not only to
conceive, but now also to still, to produce, to surround itself with the delirious
statues of a fallen real.
The Medusa Complex is the operational psyche of syncretism,
that which brings together not only disparate ways of perceiving and believing,
but of being—that which transforms through precisely its refusal of
traditional boundaries, of flesh or stone, of mythology or history, of intellect
or art. But more than that, The
Medusa Complex in fact reverses these boundaries, rendering them unintelligible,
non-functional—fictional, but paradoxically present none-the-less. In
this sense, contemporary individuality has become performative to a point
of excess—the intoxication with postmodern possibility becoming the
grounding point for a discursive leap into the possibilities of imaginative
formulation
The Medusa Complex is the governing psychological drive of
a posthuman world, now stripped of its responsibility to remain fictional.
The Postmodern Mirror-Stage
As we know, postmodern thought has been credited with what
is referred to as the ‘crisis of meaning,’ in particular because
postmodernism and poststructuralism in general tend to target the very bases
of modernist and humanist structures of meaning, attempting to demonstrate
that if doubt can be levied against the foundations of meaning, then all meanings
derived from those foundations must also be called into question.
The most extreme formulation of this postmodern perspective
is probably that of Jean Baudrillard who asks: ‘Is it thought which
tips the world into uncertainty, or the other way round?’ and then concludes
that ‘being without possible verification, the world is a fundamental
illusion.’[2]
Baudrillard is not alone in this assertion however. Echoes of similar positions
cut across the postmodern and poststructural spectrums, from Jacques Derrida's
‘indeterminacy,’ to Michel Foucault's ‘discipline,’
Roland Barthes' ‘zero degree,’ and others.
There may, however, be a paradox in the general poststructural
project, through which definitive voices on the uncertainty of thinking rise
ironically to the theoretical stage. For example, where Barthes[3]
suggests the ’death of the author,’ he only peripherally alludes
to his own role as one such ‘dead author’; where Paul Virilio[4] suggests a theory
of ‘sightless vision,’ we are still expected to trust the way
he sees; where Foucault[5] speaks of ‘normalization’
we do not suspect that his position is itself ‘normalized.’ There
is, consequently, a potentially devastating irony present in the writings
of many of these authors, one that might even be used to undermine the authority
of their respective claims to uncertainty.
What this is to suggest is quite simply that there inevitably
reaches a point at which the deconstructive gaze is turned inwards and the
stakes of the poststructural question are reversed—the certainty of
the conclusion is now inevitably tempered by the uncertainty of the voice
concluding. Consequently, there persists within postmodern method the possibility
of an uncertain confrontation with uncertainty itself. Indeed when thus phrased,
this confrontation with uncertainty becomes itself the very premise underlying
postmodern analysis in general. Embedded within its own discourse of uncertainty,
the postmodern subject is forced to confront not only the falsity of truth,
but the falsity of his of her own self-conceptions as well.
[6]
To argue this line of thinking is to self-reflexively embed
poststructuralism in its own analytic process.[7] The attempt must
then be made not only to re-read the self in face of an uncertain contextual
world, but more importantly in face of its own uncertain status as a self
to begin with. Until this point, the postmodern position that is credited
with the crisis of meaning is not itself a position in crisis. Not, that is,
until the gaze begins to turn its head on itself. For the breaching of boundaries
knows no boundaries itself, not even the boundaries of self or perception.
One might even posit this as the natural trajectory of postmodern theory,
fated from the beginning to implode into itself as the only possible way of
avoiding the paradox of its own methodology.
This is where the posthuman is born—in the embodied reflection
of poststructural uncertainty looking for the first time at itself. Posthumanism
is the postmodern mirror-stage,[8] one that looks into
the mirror without recognition, for the boundaries of identity and body have
dissolved into the uncertainty of perception, and the self no longer appears,
even to itself, without the waverings of its own impossibility. Once the self
turns its deconstructive gaze on itself, all other meaning needs to be recontextualized.
The gaze is displaced, disoriented, disassociated, and it is not the world
that is uncertain but more problematically the very site from which perception
and cognition pretended to be born.
Posthuman Reflections #1
Consider, for example, the fundamental mechanisms of perception
itself, and more specifically, the trajectory of the mirror gaze that confronts
its own illusion of being. We understand that the mirror image is reflected
back to us, and that we consequently appear to ourselves only in a reversed form, and at a smaller than life-size
scale. What we understand less is that all perception is reflected, in fact the
very mechanism of perception relies on reflected light as that which gives form to the subjects
and objects we see. This is true for photography as well, and photographers
will often go to great lengths to avoid direct light, since it inevitably
interferes with proper exposure and often obscures the details of the image.
And yet, photographers have a different word for this—the call it incidence light—and it is precisely the
photographic incident that must be avoided at all costs.
The same is true for the mirror image, and the incident of self-observation is entirely undesirable
to the pursuit of self-understanding. Instead, it is the safety of reflection
that we covet—the self-reflexivity that allows a safe distance between
ourselves and our image also is responsible for the inevitable deferral of
the encounter of self in favor of its reversed reflection—smaller
than life; indeed to be larger than life would mean that we ourselves were
the reflections, ironically staring back at the incident of our own being.
Ted Hiebert, glow-in-the-dark self-portrait:
gargoyle, 2004
Take as an example the glow-in-the-dark self portrait. There
is no body that appears, for bodies require reflection. Instead, one observes
only the painted bodily surface—the architectural frame for rhetorical self-declaration.
This is the incident body, rhetorical because it has no self-image—in fact self-image is an
impossibility for it. What is lost in the incident of self, what is lost in
the encounter of self, is precisely the ability to self-represent. And this
only occurs because there is a limit to self-understanding, after which selves
must be content to sacrifice reflection, sacrifice recognition, sacrifice
themselves, simply in order to encounter the world around them. The postmodern
mirror-stage is precisely the abandoning of recognition that is required in
order to make sense of the world. This is syncretism not as a bringing together
of disparate ways of looking, but rather as an emerging shadow of nothingness
that allows for all forms of disparity on the condition that none of them
are required.
The Death of Falsity
Under the sign of subjectivity in crisis the postmodern conclusion
is reformulated in inverse terms. For if postmodernism can be credited with
the breakdown of ontological meaning, which is to say that if postmodernism
can be credited with the ‘death of truth,’ then it must also most
certainly be credited with the death of falsity as well—the spectral double
of the ontological dialectic is necessarily rendered equally immobilized as
its apparent counterpart. Under the sign of uncertainty, in other words, ontological
contingency is the name of the game—a game now that no longer is simply
content to de-throne a world of intellectual icons, but must face itself as
merely another facet in the uncertainty of speculative contemplation. Under
the sign of uncertainty, discourse no longer proceeds on the basis of ontology
at all, but rather now merely on the contingencies of embedded possibility.
There is however, a nuance to this formulation that suggests
that the deaths of truth and falsity may not be equivalent deaths. In part
this is due to the embedded nature of poststructural uncertainty under the
sign of the postmodern mirror stage – the point after which uncertainty
itself becomes facialized as the endgame not only of discursive analysis,
but of contingent subjectivity as well. One might pause briefly to reflect
that what ultimately killed truth was its possibilities for deferral into
uncertainty. In a postmodern era, no truth can be merely that which it pretends
to be—rather each truth is itself subject to multiple deconstructive
patterns which ultimately force it into a state of undecidability. Truth,
in other words, can no longer be truthfully thought without either ignoring
or suspending the self-reflexive contingency of conviction.[9]
The case is precisely the opposite for the question of falsity
which, arguably, never had more than a spectral historical presence—the
thinking of falsity has always itself been subsumed under the auspices of
an ontological inquiry into the nature of truth. In other words, to claim
a falsity is to constitute it as ‘truly’ false, and the gaze that
concludes has only ever been the gaze of the illusion of truth, constituting
falsity as the ‘negative truths’ that maintain the dialectic.
However, the death of truth has real consequences for the repositioning of
the question of falsity, for when the negative truth that constitutes the
false as false is itself rendered contingent; we find the very structure of
falsity frustrated.
Until now, undecidability has never been an argument against
falsity. For falsity has always relied on appearing as that which it is not.
Until disproved, falsity masquerades as truth—indeed the pretense
of truth has always been fundamental to the makeup of falsity. Consequently, one might argue that
falsity, as a concept, always requires precisely the element of unverifiability
that resists its entry into negative truth. Falsity, in order to remain false,
must also remain in the realm of unverifiable possibility. It is not falsity
proper that dies under the sign of the postmodern, but rather its ability
to convincingly masquerade as true.
In this sense, with the death of falsity, the entire lexicon
of contemporary discourse is structurally reversed. No longer do we live under
the sign of scientific method and humanist analysis, but just the opposite.
No longer are phenomena false until proven true, but rather all possibilities
remain in flux, fictional masquerades that can be entertained and explored
or dismissed and ignored but never proven. Under the sign of dead truth, falsity
suffers an impossible fate: death through fictional mobilization, suspended into existence itself.
Becoming true—which is to say becoming the general rule—is
what ultimately kills falsity.
Interlude
While the stories tell us that Athene was the one responsible
for Medusa's transformation, it might just as easily have been Dionysus—with
one difference. What was, for Athene, a terrible punishment, was for Dionysus
just the opposite. Consider the story of King Midas, who was rewarded by Dionysus
for entertaining the satyr Silenus:
[Dionysus] sent
to ask how Midas wished to be rewarded. He replied without hesitation: 'Pray
grant that all I touch be turned to gold.' However, not only stones, flowers,
and the furnishings of his house turned to gold but, when he sat down to table,
so did the food he ate and the water he drank. Midas soon begged to be released
from his wish, because he was fast dying of hunger and thirst; whereupon Dionysus,
highly entertained, told him to visit the source of the river Pactolus, near
Mount Tmolus, and there wash himself. He obeyed, and was at once freed from
the golden touch...[10]
How quickly the posthuman gift becomes a burden, whether it
be stone or gold, the power of sight or that of touch. The touch of Midas
is of course the same as the gaze of Medusa herself, this time however without
the exit of holy baptism—condemned to the fate of our worst and best
wishes, at the whim of imaginative fancy. The danger of fictional mobilization
is precisely the suspension of our own uncertainties of being in face of the
prophetic gaze of masquerade itself.
Aesthetic Suspension
With the death of falsity we encounter a form of death not
previously in our general discursive rhetoric. Here, we encounter precisely
a form of possibility that has always existed only in the realm of aesthetic contemplation. For at the heart of
the discursive possibilities open to a posthuman mind is a fundamental mechanism
of suspension that is required to entertain what would otherwise belong only
to the realm of the ironic. In fact, and in a strangely circuitous way, these
observations about the trajectory of postmodern inquiry lead directly back
to the 19th century and a written request by Samuel Taylor Coleridge who asks
his readers for a ‘willing suspension of disbelief for the moment that
constitutes poetic faith’.[11]
This notion of ‘suspended disbelief’ is now exactly the same mechanism
that is required for the possibility of critical thought in an uncertain,
posthuman world.
This suggestion may seem controversial: in our contemporary
world, aesthetics precedes all other forms of intellectual analysis.
This, however, is the necessary consequence of the spectral persistence of
dead falsity as the foundation for imaginative thinking. For the aesthetic
gaze is the only residue of the history of philosophy that is left unshaken
by the ontological breakdown of meaning—that gaze that persists beyond
the crisis of meaning for no other reason than it only ever sought to suspend judgments of meaning in favor of possibility, and which consequently is now in
a unique position to become the pervasive foundation of posthuman thinking
in general. In other words, in contemporary times the gaze has itself become
fundamentally aesthetic, suspended in disbelief, no longer by choice or even
by strategy, but now in fact structurally suspended as the natural consequence of posthuman reflexivity
and the death of falsity.
Interestingly enough, a similar conclusion to this can be found
in the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, and particularly in the preface to
The Birth of Tragedy where Nietzsche asserts that ‘the existence of the world can be
justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon.’[12]
And it is significant here to note that Nietzsche’s framework for such
an assertion is remarkably similar to our own, growing from precisely the
same observations on the impossibility of philosophical or subjective certainty
in an age of deconstructed identities. We know, of course, Nietzsche’s
famous declaration that ‘God is Dead.’ What we hear less often,
but is no less apparent in his writings is that with the death of God comes
the death of authority in all forms, from the death of the teacher to the
death of the author, and ultimately to the deaths of truth and falsity as
well. One need only look to Thus Spoke Zarathustra to see this confirmed – the infamous assertion that
‘God is dead’ and its immediate contextualization within a larger
project of declining authority:
Truly, I advise you: go away from me and guard yourselves against
Zarathustra! And better still: be ashamed of him! Perhaps he has deceived
you. … One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil. And
why, then, should you not pluck at my laurels? You respect me; but how if
one day your respect should tumble? Take care that a falling statue does not
strike you dead![13]
And, even in the mere confluence of these concepts—the
death of God and the death of the teacher—it is immediately apparent
that for Nietzsche the question of belief is always already subject to the
question of speculative possibility. In this sense, Nietzsche predicted what
we are only just beginning to understand: thinking itself functions not according
to the principles of truth, but rather those of conviction, and to doubt a conviction (in true
poststructural spirit) is to question the believability of the masquerade. Zarathustra’s declarations
are those of Nietzsche's own voice—the posthumous voice of an already
dead-author.
The importance of this position however, stems well past the
imperative to self-determine. For one also repays a teacher badly if one assumes
that one can teach oneself. And to mimic Zarathustra, in this case, is to
remove the dynamic of authority from the interpretation and to say simply:
‘take care that your do not strike yourself dead.’ For this is much more
than a repositioning of the student in face of the teacher—this, in
fact, is a repositioning of the teacher in face of himself. And what needs to be emphasized here
is that this death is self-reflexive, meaning that Nietzsche includes himself—even
making an example of himself – in his own declarations.
Consequently, what is true for the world may well be true for
the questions of identity as well, and if the existence of the world is only
justifiable aesthetically, one might assert—rather convincingly—that
the existence of the self—or
even existence itself—is
also reducible to an aesthetic justification.
Posthuman Reflections #2
The aesthetic suspension of contemporary discourse is not to
be taken rhetorically, for it no longer has anything at all to do with the
formulation of truth or the real. Instead, under the sign of dead falsity,
all that now matters is the masquerade—the encounter, the incident—the
self-fulfilling prophecy of existence is only self-fulfilling when it realizes
it no longer has any conditions of being.
For in the end, being is—and must be—blind to
itself. An incidental subject is required for such an encounter. And because
there is no body present that is not itself merely the context for masquerade,
even the image
is liberated from form under such a paradigm. No longer is it required that
we put ourselves on
in order to participate in the masquerade of existence. Now, in fact, what
is required is precisely that we take ourselves off. The condition of subjectivity
is not subject to error.
Ted Hiebert, glow-in-the-dark self-portrait:
gargoyle, 2004
And, if I were to consider myself a gargoyle—who could
prove me wrong? I no longer claim my image as my own, and consequently I am
not bound by the rhetorical arguments levied against appearance. The delusion
is harmless, and yet it is none-the-less possible—perhaps even itself
the operational condition of subjectivity in general.
This is syncretism as quixotic, for when there is no longer
a singular site upon which to collapse the accusation of being, nor is there
any requirement whatsoever that being take a singular form—in appearance
or otherwise. And the self-portrait under such a sign is not to be taken rhetorically
either, for the portrait of incidence will always be incidental, casually
indulging in its masquerade with a glee usually reserved for the narcissist.
But this time is different, for while Narcissus lost himself irreparably in
the seduction with his own self-image, this time, while the image may well
remain static, the site of perception begins to radically change—and
it is a kaleidoscope of altered perceptions—a multiplicity of observing
sites and bodies—that causes the image itself to appear destabilized,
ever fascinating because it can no longer ever be made to belong.
Postmodern Dionysus
The invocation of Nietzsche in this context is, of course,
intentional. I would like to suggest in fact that because of the similarities
between Nietzsche's proclamations on the death of authority and our own trajectory
into the posthuman uncertainty of truth, Nietzsche's aesthetic theory is of
particular importance to understanding the state of critical inquiry that
persists beyond the death of falsity and the aesthetic suspension of discourse.
To simplify Nietzsche's aesthetics, for the sake of clarity,
would be to constitute it as a model that fluctuates between two poles of
artistic engagement, commonly referred to as those of representation and experience—as
examples of Nietzsche's categories of the Apollonian and the Dionysian respectively.
Nietzsche however, is somewhat more explicit and, in addition to the
god of representation, Apollo is more fundamentally the god of dreams, illusion,
appearances and the drive towards identity.[14] In this, one might suggest that Apollo
is also the humanist god, and the god of autonomous being. On the other hand,
in addition to representing the ecstatic moment of experience, Dionysus is
the god of intoxication, forgetting and delirium, as well as he who is hostile
and seeks at every turn to destroy the identity principle.[15]
Here, Dionysus might be seen as the postmodern equivalent to the humanist
Apollo.
To read The Birth of Tragedy outside of its historical context
would be to suggest a two-fold model of aesthetic engagement, in which the
representational encounter is tempered by its experiential counterpart—a
non-competitive model in which dreams can be seen as intoxicating and intoxication
can be see to yield its own form of dream. In other words, the interrelationship
of experience and representation here begins to form a circular model in which
the postmodern 'will to otherness' and the humanist 'othering of will' congeal
as the contemporary dynamic between subjectivity and uncertainty, as the displaced
dynamic of aesthetic engagement.[16]
From this perspective, the Apollonian and the Dionysian can be seen as no
longer necessarily in competition with one another. In fact there is the very real possibility that they may be
complementary; a posthuman syncretism emerges with the fusion of intoxication
and dreams.
A problem arises however, when one side of the equation begins
to dominate the possibilities of the other. This was the problem in Nietzsche's
time, and it is the reason why The Birth of Tragedy has been read largely as a critique
of the representational emphasis placed on art. For this reason, the category
of the Dionysian is privileged in The Birth of Tragedy as a call to artists to re-infuse
their practice with an element of experiential commitment – a resistance
to direct representation in favor of an experiential understanding of art-making,
and a call for the dream of aesthetics to also embrace its intoxicating potential.
This is also why, under the sign of a Nietzschean aesthetics, a Dionysian
condition must be levied towards artistic production:
For art to exist, for any sort of aesthetic activity or perception
to exist, a certain physiological precondition is indispensable: intoxication.[17]
Given however, the emerging similarities between the Dionysian
and the postmodern, it might well be suggested in this context that we have
listened to Nietzsche all too well. In other words, there is one major difference between the historical
context to which The Birth of Tragedy responds, and the contemporary instance
in which we seek to apply it. Namely, if in Nietzsche's times the problem
with aesthetics was that it was dominated by its Apollonian form, what we
encounter in contemporary times is rather a seduced Apollo, intoxicated by
the uncertain proliferations of his own self-representations. In other words,
Apollo has ceded to Dionysus as the dominant figure of contemporary aesthetics.
While this may seem, at first glance, counter-intuitive, one
must remember that the postmodern decline of truth and certainty find correlatives
in the contemporary theoretical drive away from identifiable identities, away
from representations that are not themselves subject to constant scrutiny—in
short away from the dream of humanist thinking, and into the delirium of postmodern
intoxication.[18] Dionysus is the god of 'suspended disbelief'—the
symbol of contemporary thinking under the specter of falsity. This, in other
words, is the overarching consequence of postmodernism in general—not
the seduction of the image as a representation of itself in the name of individuality,
but rather an intoxication with itself at the expense of certainty and truth and individuality.
Postmodernism is the intoxicated celebration of defeated humanism.
Posthumanism, in equivalent ways, is postmodernism's hangover.
One does not, however, leave such intoxication without having
been transformed, and the recovery of a lost humanism is no solution to the
postmodern crisis. It is no longer as simple as to revert to an Apollonian
aesthetic drive to recover the de-throned image of representational being.
We have been well-trained to doubt the truth of the image, to doubt even its
dream. Now, we must begin to doubt our doubt, to engage in full force with
the death of falsity as that which suspends disbelief in the representational
masquerade, suspends disbelief in subjectivity itself, in the name of the
aesthetic possibilities for a posthuman existence.
Posthuman Reflections #3
Gargoyles, of course, are those frozen monuments that are posed
to ward of evil—forces of darkness that are unintelligible because they
refuse reflected appearance and stem inevitably from the realm of the unknown.
Chimeric in nature, the gargoyle is almost always a hybrid creature: part
bat, part dragon, often part human as well – neither from here nor from
any identifiable elsewhere. Poised between worlds, the gargoyle is the terrifying
guardian of that which we refuse to acknowledge in ourselves.
Ted Hiebert, glow-in-the-dark self-portrait:
gargoyle, 2004
Some rumors have it that in fact gargoyles are alive. Frozen
as statuesque monuments by day, born into flesh at the fall of night. But
one might well put this differently, for along these lines it might be suggested
that gargoyles only come alive when reflections themselves cease with the
light of day. Stoned by day, intoxicated at night. Quixotic censors, gargoyles
are also reminders that all self-delusions are equivalent, and in each case
depend on an intoxicated world of delusional encounter. The disparity of such
behavior is lost, indeed disparity now only exists where it is constituted,
and only for as long as the constitution is maintained.
This is syncretism intoxicated by itself—for paradox,
contradiction and even hypocrisy no longer hold any meaning whatsoever. Their
meaning is lost, with the death of truth, with the death of falsity, with
the crisis of meaning. And yet, this is far from a utopian vision of potentiality,
for the self—now accountable only to its uninhibited self-constitution—is
nevertheless accountable to its own incidence of being. This, in fact, is
syncretism as consequence—ultimately a consequence of incidence, in all its unintelligibility,
in all its uncertainty, and in all its incoherence.
The Medusa Complex
No longer intelligible through its traditional mechanisms of
understanding, the posthuman self needs new tools for its formulations of
subjectivity. From the moment of posthuman birth, out of the shattered reflections
of the postmodern mirror-stage, impossibility no longer exists except as a
convenient aesthetic fiction used to ground the intoxication of an inverted
narcissism. For the gaze no longer constitutes, but deconstitutes; and the
possibility of an absented self is far more intoxicating in terms of potentialities
for refashioning than one bestowed through humanist spirit. And while the
self under the sign of intoxication is contingent at best, it nevertheless
already realizes that its contingency cannot be avoided and the intoxication
of possibility is equivalent to the suspended disbelief with which selves
now return their own gazes.
To return then to the Medusa myth is to suggest that the complex
of mind being negotiated as the aesthetic grounding for contemporary existence
precisely is no longer able to convincingly embed itself in either the Apollonian
tradition of humanist constitution, nor in the Dionysian tradition of postmodern
deconstitution, but rather one in which the simultaneous existence of these
two ways of looking has become itself intense to a point of unintelligibility.
In other words, despite the rational paradox of such a formulation, the urgency
of self-conception in fact requires a necessary syncretism of the contingency
of masquerade and the suspension of self-image under the sign of a posthuman
aesthetics.
Medusa's gaze has become the norm—Artaud's ‘active
metaphysics’ of thought-as-incantation[19]
is bested only by a gaze that acknowledges this same mechanism as its fundamental
and necessary structural condition. And, under the sign of the posthuman,
under the sign of the Medusa Complex as that state of mind that persists after
the crises of meaning and subjectivity, the contemporary self has been rendered
purely performative—an aesthetic refashioning of its own dreams of intoxication—stoned
by its self-defined tactics of social and cultural engagement. The posthuman
faces a creative and intellectual freedom for which it is entirely unprepared—the
only condition upon which is the condition of suspended disbelief as the groundwork
for the mobilization of falsity that would otherwise fade into nothingness.
Consider the story of Michelangelo, famed sculptor of the Renaissance,
who believed that hidden within each marble block was an idealized human form,
and who further identified the precise manner in which these forms could be
discovered:
The marble not yet carved can hold the form of every thought
the greatest artist ever has, and no conception can yet come to pass unless
the hand obeys the intellect. [20]
And isn't this the humanist dream as well? The revealing of
form, the cultivation of truth, through the aspirations of intellectual reason?
And might this not be why we look with terror upon the figure of Medusa, she
who had no need of intellect to reveal the carved stone that each of us wears
as our own humanist armor?
No longer does the hand obey the intellect. Rather now, the
intellect obeys perception itself. And this is why Michelangelo's non finito, those sculptures left unfinished
and rough are the most compelling and enigmatic part of his oeuvre, and indeed
of ours as well—uncertainty left to roam unfinished, contingent, freed
from a statuesque destiny, intoxicating both us and themselves through exactly
their unfinished possibilities.
The Medusa Complex as a theory of posthuman intellectuality
is consequently one that reanimates and reverses the terms of intoxicated
engagement. No longer is the gaze of Medusa simply the gaze that freezes its
objects in statuesque oblivion, but rather now that which remobilizes the
stone itself. Under the sign of the Postmodern Dionysus, under the sign of
intoxicated stone, fictions become golems, dreams grow legs and minds of their
own, and the monuments to a frozen humanist history begin to proliferate and
roam, decentered and uncertain about even their own status as the icons they
thought themselves to be.
A theory
of stoned posthumanism allows for the mobilization of dead falsity, resurrected
into the aesthetic fictions of posthuman living.